Dajuan Harris, the only Kansas player to publicly confirm he’s be back for the 2025 season (as of 3/28/2024), is a very polarizing player. Some in and around the program have called him “the best pure PG in the country,” while others see his lack of offensive production as a huge hamstring on the Kansas basketball program. Many fans want Harris gone, or at the very least benched, despite Dajuan being a 3-year starter and having a National Championship ring. What gives?
Like most things, the truth lies somewhere in between. Not unlike another one of Self’s favorites that caught some grief, Russell Robinson. Remarkably, both Harris and Robinson have had similar careers.
Which is which? Russell is listed first, and you do see a difference with the assist (Harris’s stronger attribute) and rebound (Robinson’s stronger attribute) numbers. Russ Rob was a little better scorer but a worse overall shooter.
Other similarities lie in their career-arcs. Neither were starters or heavy contributors as freshmen, but then earned the starting role as sophomores playing alongside better talent. Both retained the starting PG job despite ups-and-downs, and in fact each had disappointing senior seasons when looking at individual stats. Here are the two players’ Per100AB value-stats by season.
Frosh: -3.21 Soph: +2.31 Jr.: +0.62 Sr.: -0.29
Frosh: -5.18 Soph: -1.72 Jr.: +3.46 Sr.: -0.23
Robinson is listed first again. His sophomore season was his best from a value-metric perspective. Harris’ peak season was his junior year. But by the time they were seniors, their value was just slightly south of bubble-level.
The other important value-stat, Wins Above Replacement, which accumulates an estimated win total above that of a Division 1 player, has each player at exactly +5.47 WAR (as of 3/28/2024). To be so close in WAR over the same career-length is to essentially be the same player from a value-perspective. Since 1993, this places them at the 48th/49th spots in terms of career WAR (out of 185 players).
Looking deeper at their value profiles, we see that defense plays a larger role than offense in each PG’s games. Aside from 2006 when he had a solid season scoring the ball, Russ Rob was always a below-bubble offensive player. His defense, on the other hand, was positive during the years he started. Harris has never had an above-bubble offensive season, although in 2023 he was close, but his defense has been solid for the most part over his last 3 years.
In 2008, Robinson’s senior season, Kansas cut down the nets thanks to great play from a number of talented players. Robinson helped KU win the title that season, but he didn’t carry the team. Kansas did so thanks to the contributions of future NBA-players, especially Mario Chalmers, Brandon Rush, Darrell Arthur, Darnell Jackson, Sherron Collins, and Sasha Kaun.
Similarly, in 2022, Harris’s sophomore season, Kansas cut down the nets thanks to a bevy of talent. Harris did his part, but he didn’t carry the team. Kansas had 3 future NBA-wings in Ochai Agbaji, Christian Braun, and Jalen Wilson. It also had an all-Pac 12 conference transfer in Remy Martin and a solid scoring center in David McCormack who was a senior.
For Robinson, his last game in college ended in glory. For Harris, his last two teams have been bounced in the Round of 32. But Robinson was able to play on the best KU team during his last season, while Harris’s best team (so far) was during his sophomore year. This may be clouding what we think of Harris at the moment.
Finally, the one key difference between these two players’ career arcs is the fifth season that Harris will get to play. Dajuan has an extra chance to add to his legacy. By the end of next year, Harris will have a different WAR and different post-season legacy, for good or bad. Thinking back to the freshman-heavy 2009 team, one would have to think that having Russell Robinson as a fifth-year player would have made that team better. Similarly, keeping Harris means KU has a PG it knows can contribute at a certain baseline. They should and will certainly try to add to the backcourt for the 2025 season, but don’t write-off Dajuan just because he isn’t a star. He has a role, and he can help KU if the team has enough offensive and defensive talent around him.
Note: The value-metrics in this write-up might not match the final published numbers, as the 2024 college basketball season is still being played. But since KU’s season is complete, the only changes to value-metrics will be small and due to what happens with KU’s opponents and how their computer metrics trickle down.
The 2024 team came in with high expectations. Landed the best big-man transfer in the portal. Landed a sought-after portal wing and highly-athletic combo-guard. Returned three starters from team that earned a 1-seed in 2023. A McDonald’s All-American guard leading a decent recruiting class. A healthy coach. Pre-season AP #1. This took a bit of a hit when they lost Arterio Morris to a felony charge. Even still, on paper the team was expected to be good.
For the most part during the non-conference, Kansas lived up to expectations. Sure, its computer metrics took a when it failed to blow out certain teams it should have (Eastern Illinois, UMKC, Missouri). But it got huge wins against the likes of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Connecticut. At 12-1 heading into conference play, the team was trending toward another 1-seed.
The conference schedule was back-loaded in terms of difficulty, so the Jayhawks knew they had to play well in January. Unfortunately, the team lost to UCF and West Virginia on the road (as well as Kansas State in early February). It did have nice home wins—including a 13-point win against Houston in early February—but after McCullar got injured Kansas struggled to find any consistency. Since January 1, KU didn’t win or lose more than 3 games in a row. The team couldn’t find any momentum on the season, although saying the wheels fell off does seem like a stretch.
With that said, the focus on the season recap will be to look at how the roster performed relative to value metrics that help us judge players across seasons. We will also look at how each player did compared to his pre-season expectation, and finally look at the team as a whole. The shooting splits will be listed in the order of FG%/3-pt%/FT%.
Dajuan Harris
Traditional Stat-Line: 8.5 PPG, 6.5 APG, 2.0 RPG, 1.5 SPG, 0.4 BPG on 35.7 MPG, 42.4%/38.4%/80.4%.
Pre-season Value Projection: +2.50 PPGAB, +4.20 Per100AB, +4.24 WAR
Actual Value Score: -0.14 PPGAB, -0.23 Per100AB, +1.57 WAR
Harris was projected to be KU’s second most-valuable player for 2024, as that’s what he was in 2023. But he got off to an awful start to the 2024 season. Aside from a stellar shooting night against Kentucky, he failed to reach double-figures in points until Indiana (11th game of the season). His defensive metrics were poor to begin the year. Through 10 games he was a -1.27 per game defender (in 2023 he was a +2.17 per game defender). This poor play wasn’t reflected much in the team’s overall record, but it did but Juan behind the 8-ball as far as his season-long performance.
By conference season, Harris would begin to play better, improving on the whole until he started playing near the level he had last season. Over his final 15 games, Harris was +2.54 per game, right where he was projected to be on the season. As these games included the stretch run and tournament play, it should be noted that he basically became the player KU was expecting him to be by the time the games really mattered. This makes his season a bit odd. KU played better during the part of the season where its point guard was playing worse. Given how polarizing he is as a player, this makes things even more confusing.
Harris will be back in 2025. There will be plenty of time to look ahead and forecast out his final season in a Kansas uniform. But in looking back at his 2024 campaign, Harris’ Per100 value metrics put him in the 34.5%ile of all Jayhawk rotation players since 1993. You want more from your starter than this. And while he can’t shoulder all of the blame on the team’s poor season, had he been as good as expected from Day 1, the team may have been a bit more competitive.
Elmarko Jackson
Traditional Stat-Line: 4.3 PPG, 1.7 APG, 1.4 RPG, 0.8 SPG, 0.1 BPG on 18.6 MPG, 40.6%/26.7%/76.9%.
Pre-season Value Projection: +0.10 PPGAB, +0.20 Per100AB, +1.44 WAR
Actual Value Score: -2.20 PPGAB, -6.83 Per100AB, -1.26 WAR
Freshmen are basically projected on a curve given their incoming class-ranking, so Jackson was expected to be about bubble-level given how the rating services saw him as a high school senior. Even during the off-season, 2024 NBA mock drafts had him as a possible lottery pick given his intangibles (explosive player, good size as a guard, decent-looking stroke, and so on). Nothing close to this potential developed in 2024. Jackson was given the starting spot in the backcourt to begin the season—in large part due to the poor play of others competing for that role—until he started to slump at the beginning of conference play as was replaced by Johnny Furphy.
Jackson’s season is at the bottom of the list in terms of KU history since 1993. He had the second-worst PPGAB score over the last 3+ decades (Quentin Grimes). His Per100 score was in the 3.85%ile of all rotation players, clearing only a hand-full of role-players and walk-ons who played minutes on past KU teams with depth issues (i.e. Jeff Hawkins and Moulaye Niang in 2003). His WAR, thanks to him playing so many minutes, was the worst in the 1993-2024 span.
It was a disaster of a season for Elmarko. He appeared in all 34 games, but only had an above-bubble impact in 8 of them. (Offensively, he was above-bubble in only 5 of 34). His non-conference play of -0.83 PPGAB looks relatively strong, compared to how he ended the season. Since the beginning of the conference season in early January, Jackson was a -3.05 PPGAB player.
Kevin McCullar
Traditional Stat-Line: 18.3 PPG, 4.1 APG, 6.0 RPG, 1.5 SPG, 0.4 BPG on 34.2 MPG, 45.4%/33.3%/80.5%.
Pre-season Value Projection: +1.71 PPGAB, +3.25 Per100AB, +3.23 WAR
Actual Value Score: +3.97 PPGAB, +6.71 Per100AB, +4.22 WAR
McCullar was a late-returnee for Kansas, coming back after nearly going pro. His return was certainly good news in the summer, but when he came out with an improved shot and stronger offensive game in the non-conference, KU was playing its best ball. Kevin cleared his PPGAB estimate by over 2 points and his Per100AB estimate by over 3 points. And even though he got injured and missed 8 ½ games, his WAR was over a win above expected.
McCullar had the highest PPGAB and Per100AB marks of any Jayhawk this season, and his WAR was third on the team but closely behind two players with 248 and 173 more minutes of game action. McCullar’s injury prevented him from adding to his legacy, as his efficiency waned during the part of the season he was trying to play through the pain.
Overall, Kevin’s jump in performance was a pleasant surprise in a season with few of them, and makes his injury and even more frustrating. When he was out there, he was an 85.1%ile Jayhawk, which is right on par with Ben McLemore’s lone season (2013).
K.J. Adams
Traditional Stat-Line: 12.6 PPG, 3.1 APG, 4.6 RPG, 1.1 SPG, 0.6 BPG on 33.5 MPG, 60.1%/0.0%/60.0%.
Pre-season Value Projection: +0.93 PPGAB, +1.90 Per100AB, +2.33 WAR
Actual Value Score: +2.88 PPGAB, +4.98 Per100AB, +4.42 WAR
Alongside McCullar, K.J. Adams was KU’s most-improved player. He overachieved his PPGAB and Per100AB expected scores by 2 and 3 points respectively, and added 2 WAR above his projection. Adams’s offensive value was right where we thought it would be, it was his defense that made a huge leap. Adams was KU’s best defender, allowing 0.145 points per possession (or 8.7 points per 60 possessions). His strength, quickness, and ability to switch to both guards and posts helped KU put together a mostly acceptable defense for much of the season. Adams was also healthy and consistent, something no other Jayhawk from 2024 can really say. He was the team-MVP in 11 of KU’s 34 games, which led the team this year.
Another polarizing player, we will focus on 2025 and his role at a later date. But KU was barely a tournament team without Adams (even if McCullar/Dickinson were healthy all season). Unfortunately, he had his worst game of the season against Gonzaga, especially on the defensive end. For the season, he had a Per100AB at the 75.2%ile, which is very similar to the per possession value Julian Wright gave as a freshman (2006). And K.J. did this playing far more minutes and less rest. Adams’ value was very under-appreciated.
Hunter Dickinson
Traditional Stat-Line: 17.9 PPG, 2.3 APG, 10.9 RPG, 0.9 SPG, 1.4 BPG on 32.2 MPG, 54.8%/35.4%/62.4%.
Pre-season Value Projection: +5.18 PPGAB, +9.25 Per100AB, +6.88 WAR
Actual Value Score: +3.45 PPGAB, +6.19 Per100AB, +4.77 WAR
Hunter Dickinson had a good season, producing the second-highest PPGAB and Per100AB scores on the team and the highest WAR. Let’s start with that fact, so that the rest of the discussion will be in its proper context. Within this context, Dickinson very-much underachieved his projected totals, and his play worsened as the season progressed (even before his shoulder injury).
Hunt was a +5.40 PPGAB player through the home Houston game, when KU looked like it had turned a corner and was poised to have a strong February run building into March. After that game, beginning with the road K-State contest, Hunt was a -0.45 per game player. This was seen on both ends of the floor, but especially on defense. Over these last 11 games he played (he missed the Cincinnati game in Kansas City), Dickinson was a -2.41 per game defender. His shooting, particularly behind the 3-point and free-throw lines, got worse and hurt his overall offensive game. Even during his slumps, his offense was good enough to be value-adding.
On the season, Dickinson had 9 team-MVP games and had the best performance overall in his dominance of Tennessee’s big men during the third-place game at the Maui Invitational. But that seems like months ago because it was. He saw the likes of Samford take advantage of his propensity to over-hedge ball screens and recover slowly. Teams kept hurt the Jayhawks on this play, to the point that March Madness analyst Brendan Haywood pointed out that KU should think about dropping him into the lane to cover ball-screens this way. We would agree.
Dickinson was in many ways the anti-Harris. He started the season great but limped to the finish, unlike Harris who came around during the late push. But we don’t want to ignore Hunter’s 82.5%ile mark, second on the team and comparable to Nick Collison as a sophomore (2001). From a WAR perspective, Hunt’s season compared to the seasons of other big-men such as Perry Ellis as a junior (2015) or Jeff Withey either his junior or senior seasons (2012 or 2013). These are solid players, and show that Hunt added quite a bit of value.
Nicolas Timberlake
Traditional Stat-Line: 5.2 PPG, 0.6 APG, 1.9 RPG, 0.5 SPG, 0.1 BPG on 15.4 MPG, 38.3%/30.3%/78.6%.
Pre-season Value Projection: +0.32 PPGAB, +0.75 Per100AB, +1.50 WAR
Actual Value Score: -0.93 PPGAB, -3.50 Per100AB, -0.18 WAR
Timberlake had a rough season, producing 4 points worse Per100AB than expected. His poor play, particularly to start the season, also lowered his minutes volume…not something this KU team needed given its depth issues. And by the time Nick started to play better, KU had injuries to key pieces. We really never saw him filling his role when KU was at its best, although there were glimpses such as his senior-night performance vs. K-State.
In the non-conference, Timberlake played at a -1.78 PPGAB. Starting January 1, which was the beginning of conference play on through the NCAA Tournament, his performance was at -0.41 per game. This improvement was more pronounced on the defensive end, where he would grade out as a +0.27 per game player. He was able to move his feet okay, grabbed enough rebounds, and otherwise was a healthy and energetic player.
But his offense, unfortunately, never really clicked. He was officially credited with 22 assists on the season, which, as a 2-guard, is really terrible. We had him with 17 value-assists, which even if you doubled his minutes, would come to about 1 per game on 30 minutes. His shot didn’t consistently fall, which really hurt the value he provided to the team.
Timberlake was at the 14.0%ile of all Jayhawk rotation players since 1993. A close comp here would be 2010 Brady Morningstar or 2023 Joseph Yesufu. Given that Timberlake was meant to be a step-up from Yesufu, this was a major disappointment.
Positive moments Nick will be remembered for are his athletic dunks as well as drawing a late foul against Samford and knocking down 2 FT’s to put KU up 3 in the final seconds.
Johnny Furphy
Traditional Stat-Line: 9.0 PPG, 1.0 APG, 4.9 RPG, 0.9 SPG, 0.8 BPG on 24.1 MPG, 46.6%/35.2%/76.5%.
Pre-season Value Projection: -0.84 PPGAB, -6.30 Per100AB, -0.49 WAR
Actual Value Score: -0.23 PPGAB, -0.54 Per100AB, +0.90 WAR
Furphy was KU’s latest roster move, he joined the team so late he didn’t even play in Puerto Rico in August, and he wound up being the only newcomer to meet expectations. His were low, given limited information about him from recruiting services and the unknown about foreign players. Compared to Svi Mykhailiuk, Furphy had a much stronger season as a frosh than Svi did. After cementing his role as KU’s fifth starter (when the team was fully healthy), Furphy worked his way into an above-bubble player for the Jayhawks during the middle of conference play. He had some rough moments down the stretch of the season to finish below-bubble, but he was comfortably above D-1 average and therefore produced nearly 1 full win above replacement.
Furphy was at the 32.1%ile of Jayhawk players who crack the rotation, which was very close to Wayne Selden’s freshman season (2014). A career trajectory like Selden’s would be excellent news for Kansas. We shall see what happens with Johnny, a skilled scorer with clear pro potential.
Johnny’s offense ended up worse than his defense, which seems strange. Furphy’s defense wasn’t great, but he did add value by rebounding and just competing. His inability to break down defenses or generate points for others (only 28 value-assists on the season) took away from his solid shooting numbers.
Parker Braun
Traditional Stat-Line: 2.2 PPG, 0.3 APG, 1.6 RPG, 0.2 SPG, 0.6 BPG on 7.5 MPG, 66.7%/36.4%/66.7%.
Pre-season Value Projection: -0.39 PPGAB, -2.75 Per100AB, 0.00 WAR
Actual Value Score: -0.70 PPGAB, -5.44 Per100AB, -0.33 WAR
Parker was projected to be a replacement player, or average D1 guy coming in as a backup to Hunter Dickinson. The fact he didn’t get there is important, although he was never the guy who was going to make or break the season for Kansas. Parker knew his role, but his defense was never where it needed to be. He did shoot a high percentage, mostly on lob-dunks and layup attempts, but his lack of production hurt the team whenever he played.
Braun’s play registered at the 6.9%ile of all Kansas Jayhawk rotation players since ’93. He was about as good, per possession, as sophomore Mitch Lightfoot (2018), who played a similar role for a Final Four team when he backed up Doke. Braun played 18.6% of available minutes, close to the 20.1% that was projected for him.
Jamari McDowell
Traditional Stat-Line: 1.8 PPG, 0.5 APG, 1.2 RPG, 0.2 SPG, 0.1 BPG on 7.2 MPG, 30.8%/28.1%/84.2%.
Pre-season Value Projection: -0.72 PPGAB, -6.02 Per100AB, -0.40 WAR
Actual Value Score: -0.75 PPGAB, -6.01 Per100AB, -0.35 WAR
Jamari’s projection was the most accurate. We even nailed his minutes (he played 16.4%; projection was 17.1%). As a true freshman toward the lower-end of the Top 100, Jamari was never expected to be a huge contributor. With only 9 scholarship players, he filled a role as a back-up wing who was there to play defense first. McDowell’s play was at the 5.5%ile of all rotation players in KU history since ’93. He was about the same as Tristan Enaruna as a freshman (2020). Given how much better Enaruna has gotten (albeit at a low-major), there’s no reason to think McDowell can’t become a KU-level player as an upper-classman.
TEAM
We projected KU to be a +8.51 team, meaning they would beat their opponents by 8.51 more points per game than a bubble-team would be expected to. This projection, independently arrived at, was quite close to how KenPom and Bart Torvik saw them. This number ended up being +3.62 by season’s end. This ended up being the worst team in the Self-era as well as the worst team since 1993 (1989 was likely the last Kansas team to be this bad from a computer-rankings/efficiency perspective).
In October we looked at different scenarios as to how the season could play out. A median case, worst case, and best case scenario. Look at what we wrote about what could happen if KU had a worst case type of season.
In this scenario, one of its key players struggles with an injury and this weakens an already depleted roster. KU’s offense could also struggle as teams force McCullar and Adams to make jump-shots while forcing the ball out of Dickinson’s hands. On defense, while it’s difficult to see KU being bad on this end, teams could put Dickinson in high-ball pick-n-rolls and take advantage of Self’s propensity to switch screens.
If KU were to struggle enough, it could lose games it was projected to win preseason and find itself slipping down into the 5-6 seed range. In this range, a First Round upset loss is more likely and a second-weekend in the NCAA’s less likely. For KU’s worst case scenario to be a comfortable NCAA Tournament team is something most teams can’t say a few weeks before the season starts.
This is basically what happened. McCullar’s injury proved to be too much. Jump-shots stopped falling, and Hunter had more difficulty avoiding double-teams. KU’s defense faltered when Hunt was put in high-ball pick-n-rolls. Kansas did get a 4-seed, making it slightly better than it could have been, but didn’t make the second-weekend. However, its tough to see the season playing out worse under any reasonable situation. KU’s floor is so high, that it makes rebuilding easier. We won’t look ahead until later posts, but there isn’t any reason to panic about the state of the program right now.
That about puts a bow on the 2024 season. Thank you and Rock Chalk.
Dajuan Harris’s last 15 games of 2023 vs. Dajuan Harris’s first 15 games of 2024:
Stat
2023 – Last 15 Gms
2024 – First 15 Gms
PPG
11.3
6.9
eFG%
62.8%
48.5%
TS%
61.5%
471.%
APG
5.8
7.1
A/TO
3.0
2.6
SPG
2.6
1.2
RPG
2.9
2.2
ORtg
109.6
102.4
Pts AB +/-
+48.39
-44.98
PPG +/-
+3.23
-3.00
Per 100 +/-
+5.14
-4.84
The numbers speak for themselves. Another notable thing is that KU’s average opponent had a KenPom rating of +17.10 over last 15 games in 2023 compared to +4.77 over KU’s first 15 games in 2024. Juan’s drop in production and efficiency has come against weaker foes.
The last three numbers are the value scores, first in total points against bubble, and then rated in per game and per 100 possession bases. These numbers account for opponent strength as well as deeper defensive metrics such as points allowed (Harris is allowing 12.4 points per game in 2024; it was 10.0 over the last 15 in 2023).
Aside from assists, Harris has gotten worse in every facet of the game. But even with assists, his increase in assists has come with a greater increase in turnovers, meaning his overall “ball-handling” value has worsened.
This and That
The following bits of info relate to the 2024 season through KU’s first 15 games.
Johnny Furphy’s defense has been better than his offense. Per 100 possessions, Furphy is about -1.03 points to a bubble player on offense and 0.00 to a bubble player on defense. Furphy is shooting well, but he relies on assists to score and turns it over far more than he creates offense for others. Defensively, his coverage score is not terrible and he rebounds at an acceptable clip.
Elmarko Jackson has posted 3 above-bubble offensive games, or 20% of the 15 he’s played so far in his KU career. And 2 of these came in KU’s first 2 games. What’s giving him any playing time at the moment is his defense. Jackson has produced 10 positive defensive outings this season (67% of games).
K.J. Adams is KU’s best defender right now, posting a +2.23 average defensive game score. This is far better than his 2023 season, which was negative (-0.10). Adams’ improvement on defense is in large part due to him defending less in the post as an undersized 5-man, his role last season. Offensively, Adams has seen a slight decline from ’23 to ’24 (+0.60 to +0.44).
Kevin McCullar’s value-score improvement from last season to this season, on a per game basis, is +3.98. This is better than Jalen Wilson’s improvement from ’22 to ’23 (+3.34), Ochai Agbaji’s improvement from ’21 to ’22 (+3.09), and Christian Braun’s improvement from ’21 to ’22 (+3.83). The largest season-to-season jump on record is Frank Mason’s ’16 to ’17 improvement (+4.52). Thomas Robinson from ’11 to ’12 was +3.67. Tyshawn Taylor from ’11 to ’12 was +3.65. Other large jumps in the past include Raef LaFrentz from ’95 to ’96 (+3.67), Keith Langford from ’02 to ’03 (+3.59), and Drew Gooden from ’01 to ’02 (+3.41). There have certainly been other great career developments of steadier growth, but in terms of having such a large leap in value production in consecutive years, what McCullar is doing this season is very special.
Hunter Dickinson’s two worst value-score games (-10.40 vs. Marquette, -6.23 at UCF) have coincided with both of KU’s losses. Through 15 games, Hunter is currently KU’s second-most valuable player this season, but is neck-and-neck with Kevin for this distinction. If both can finish the season above +5.00 per game, they’d be the first duo since the Morris twins in 2011 to do this for a Kansas team.
Jamari McDowell has not proven to be the answer to the team’s poor wing play. The freshman has produced the worst Per 100 value of any scholarship player, at -7.91. After some initial stingy defense, Jamari has gotten scored on quite frequently in limited minutes. At best, McDowell is only going to be a role player and defense-first guy this season.
Parker Braun has been KU’s 5th-best player, and might warrant more court time. He is athletic and experienced. His value scores through 15 games have been 7 positive, 7 negative, and 1 right at 0. While he is at Kansas primarily to back up Hunter, there have been a few moments where Self has gone “small” and played Adams as the 5 when Hunter is sitting. But this leads to more minutes for guys (Jackson, Harris, Timberlake) that aren’t playing as well as Braun has, and haven’t shown enough offensive firepower to compensate the loss of not having a true center inside. Parker isn’t necessarily someone who will win you the game, but he is someone who can keep you in it until Dickinson can return.
(Long article. Scroll down to bottom for the summary)
During the midst of the 2023 season, KU had a 3-game losing streak and a date at Rupp Arena against a talented Kentucky team. Dajuan Harris was coming off poor showings in his last 2 games, and questions surrounded a team that had no true center in the starting rotation and a pass-first point guard who wasn’t a natural scorer.
Kansas went on to beat Kentucky that game, bolstered by great play from Jalen Wilson, but also a good outing from the rest of its starters, including its point guard Dajuan Harris. From that game forward, KU would play 16 games to close out the season. Harris produced a +3.22 per game value score, indicating that he was worth over 3 points per game to Kansas than a “bubble” level player would be. During this stretch, Harris was playing his best ball, comparable to a junior-year Frank Mason (2016 season) or senior-year Tyshawn Taylor (2012 season). Harris was doing it in different ways than these scoring guards; certainly through defense first, but he was also adding value on offense thanks to both shot-making and assisting.
In fact, during the closing stretch of 2023—KU’s final 10 games, Harris produced offensive value of +1.06 per game. This was third on the team behind Wilson and Gradey Dick over that period. While KU getting bounced in the Round of 32 wasn’t fun, no one can blame the play of Dajuan Harris. He was solid against the Razorbacks on both ends, adding about a point-and-a-half both ways and +3.30 points overall. For the season, Harris contributed +2.06 points per game above bubble. Roughly, based on his play, Harris was worth 2 points a night when compared to an average player on a bubble-team.
The elements for Dajuan Harris having a successful 2024 were all in place. He was coming in as a 5th-year-in-the-program player (having redshirted), 2-year starter who saw his game improve each season. Always a defense-first, pass-first player, Harris had improved during the back-half of his junior season and started to be a net contributor to the offensive scheme. This development is common, but not guaranteed, among Bill Self program guys. Harris was making the same strides in his game that others had before him. Some of these strides were unique to him, but he was playing better and making a positive mark on a program that has had numerous talented players come through.
Coming in to the 2024 season, Harris was projected to be a +2.50 player on the season, a conservative improvement on his 2023 value scores. Harris was expected to see a slight bump on both offense and defense. It wasn’t that his expectations were too high. If anything, they were somewhat low. By all appearances, Harris had figured things out. His defense had been consistent throughout his career, and now his offense had finally come around. With Hunter Dickinson coming in, his assist numbers would reach career highs. His shooting and scoring would still be there, but he wouldn’t need to do too much.
But through 10 games, this hasn’t been the case. Not only is Harris not performing to his projections, he isn’t performing anywhere near what he is capable of. He is playing worse than in 2023, by a long shot. He is also playing worse than he did in 2022, when he was a role player on the national championship team. But not only that, Harris is worse than he was in 2021 as a red-shirt freshman who rarely shot and got taken advantage of by stronger players.
Looking at Per 100 numbers, that is the value a player adds (in points) to his team over the course of 100 possessions, Harris’s development looks like this:
2021: -5.18
2022: -1.72
2023: +3.46
Players tend to improve as they age through their college careers, although again not everyone develops in this straight-forward of a manner. Some players have drops in value or flat-line after they reach certain points. So, if Harris was merely on pace to produce a similar or slightly worse season than last year, this wouldn’t be out of the ordinary. Even if Harris was noticeably worse, say close to 0.00, it would be disappointing but not unprecedented. Unfortunately, this isn’t the case, either. In fact, Harris is playing the worst basketball of his career at Kansas.
2024: -5.80
Again, this is a per possession number, so it takes into account the fact Harris is playing more than he has in past seasons. On a per possession basis, Harris is worse than a bubble-player by 5.80 points, which is even worse than his value during his freshman season of 2021.
If we look at it from a per-game mark, it looks even worse. At -3.52, Harris is producing the worse per-game mark of any Jayhawk rotation player by over a full point per game (2019 Quentin Grimes -2.40). Harris is also worse than his prior season at over 5.50 points per game. Never has there been such a drop-off, year-over-year. KU has had players unexpectedly decline, Eric Chenowith’s junior year (2000) being one example (he went from a +2.63 player to a +0.59 player), but it has never been this dramatic.
Breaking down Harris’s play so far, we’ll first look at offense, comparing his 2023 and 2024 seasons.
Going through each line, we see that Harris’s efficiency has slipped from 1.11 to 1.03. What makes this worse is that KU hasn’t faced its meaty conference schedule yet. Not only is Harris less efficient, he is less efficient against an easier schedule. Harris is accounting for nearly 2 fewer points per game on offense than he did last year, despite playing more minutes. Harris is shooting worse overall than he did last season (49.5% vs. 45.2%). He is also shooting less, despite the team needing him for more production. In turn, his impact is less this season. Once we adjust for opponent, we see that Harris is 2 points worse (in terms of overall value) on this end that he was last season.
Breaking down into offensive categories on a Per 100 possession basis, we see (2023 vs. 2024):
Not only is Harris’s scoring down, his handling (turnovers/assists) is also down. Only his boarding, or offensive rebounding value, has changed for the better. But in terms of overall value, this increase is negligible.
Defensively, Harris has declined even more.
Harris went from a stingy defender, giving up 9.2 points per 60 possessions to allowing 11.8 per 60. The other important category, possession winners (PW), went from 5.3 to 4.2 per 60. A player needs to win possessions to add value. Harris is getting fewer steals, forcing fewer turnovers, and not rebounding any better while giving up more points to his man. All despite playing an easier schedule when compared to 2023 numbers. This leads to a player who is worse on the defensive end by more than 3 points a game.
His Per 100 numbers on defense, broken down into categories:
Harris went from KU’s best defender in 2023 to its worse in 2024. How? Well, mostly by giving up too many points to his opponent. A stinginess score in the red means he has to add value from generating turnovers (which he hasn’t done well at in 2024) or rebounding (which is marginally better, but as a point guard, not ever going to be the area where he adds defensive value). This is the biggest disappointment in Dajuan’s decline. He was the Big 12 defensive Player of the Year last season. Now, he’s a liability most games.
2023 vs. 2024. Harris is over 5.50 points per game worse in 2024. He is over 9.20 points worse Per 100. He has also gone from a season where he added 3.87 Wins Above Replacement to one where he has lost 0.52 WAR.
Should Harris be benched?
Dajuan is putting up historically-bad numbers in a season which has him playing historically-high minutes. Clearly, something isn’t working with him. But if KU went to the bench, who would replace his minutes? We can’t consider Adams, McCullar, or Dickinson/Braun, players whose minutes are already maximized or aren’t suitable replacements for a guard. Let’s look at KU’s other four guards/wings in terms of player value. Remember, based on the roster, KU needs to have at least 1 of these guys on the court at all times right now. If Juan gets benched, you’ll need 2 of these 4 to play at once.
There’s a bunch of red here. For one, Nicolas Timberlake is playing worse than Harris on a per possession basis. Next, we can look at the play of Jamari McDowell and Elmarko Jackson. Neither has been much better than Harris. McDowell in particular has struggled recently after a hot start. Of these four, only Furphy has produced near bubble-level value and positive WAR.
So, let’s grant that Furphy has been better than Harris. Who else do you go with? Elmarko has had his poor moments. McDowell is very limited on offense, and his defense won’t likely become elite anytime this season. Timberlake is an even worse option. Another consideration is that, when you take Juan out, you need Kevin McCullar to run more point/generate more offense. Sure, you still have Elmarko and maybe part of the solution is giving him the keys from time-to-time. But if he’s been struggling as an off-guard with less pressure, what chance does he have being the guy to get everyone organized and the offense started?
KU’s best chances are still with Harris. He cannot, surely cannot, continue to play as poorly as he has. As a 3-year starter, Harris put up back-to-back seasons that were better than anyone else on the list above. If he could just match the 25% percentile of his play over the past two years, he’ll be much more valuable on the court than more minutes for the other four guards/wings.
Silver Lining
The good news is that Harris will not continue to play as poorly as he has. Yes, it’s been a disappointment. Here are many reasons to consider that his play will tick up.
He will get exploitable matchups as teams game plan around stopping Hunter/Kevin/K.J. He will get open layups, open 3’s, and other opportunities.
He will have a few defensive shut-down games to boost his defensive score.
As schedule gets harder, Harris will play up to his opponent. While he hasn’t done well against KU’s better opponents, he’s still better against KU’s 5 power-conference foes (-2.87 per game) than the 5 lower-tier opponents (-4.17 per game).
Harris’s score can naturally climb faster given how poor he’s been. Just a few positive games can be enough to change the narrative.
The team is currently 9-1 despite him playing poorly. Juan hasn’t been responsible for a loss, as the 14-point Marquette loss was the fault of many poor showings.
Precedence of Tyshawn Taylor in 2011. Taylor was -3.89 per game during 17 conference regular season/tournament play yet still finished the season with a solid NCAA Tournament of +3.35 per game (even his play during the VCU game wasn’t terrible). So other good players have gone through disastrous stretches but still picked things up later on.
Precedence of Remy Martin in 2022. Harris’s former teammate Martin had a disappointing regular season (-0.05 per game). But in his 9 tournament games (Big 12 + NCAA’s), Martin put up +3.66 per game in value, hitting huge shots in key moments during KU’s National Title run. Again, like Taylor, we see improvement when it matters most.
If Harris can get back to the level of play he had in 2023, his tough start to 2024 won’t matter at all.
Conclusion
Here are the key points. Dajuan’s performance through 10 games this season has been his career worst. Compared to other KU starters, Harris has been worse than any other Jayhawk in 30 years. He has seen decline in his game across all categories, but the primary problems have been with his scoring and defensive coverage. He isn’t scoring enough but is letting his man score too easily.
However, despite his poor play, Harris is a necessary component to this team. His would-be replacements are either worse or wholly unequipped to carry the load as a Big 12 point guard. Not only does he need to play, he needs to play substantial minutes for this team.
The expectation should be that Harris improves and is back to being a positive contributor by season’s end. There is precedent for good Kansas guards figuring it out by NCAA Tourney time. As KU is winning despite his poor play, a solid Dajuan Harris can make this team a true national title contender.
The 2024 Kansas Jayhawks were 23-11 (10-8) and earned a 4-seed in the NCAA Tournament. They made the Round of 32 in the NCAA Tournament before losing. The team’s Sports Reference page is here.
Offense
Defense
Total Adjusted PPGAB +/-
Value Seen 4 Ways
Cumulative Points Above Bubble on the Season Chart
Summary
KU’s big 3 of McCullar, Adams, and Dickinson accounted for 100.1% of the team’s WAR this season, making it the first time since at least 1993 where a Kansas team had its three best players be over 100% of total WAR.
Similarly, KU only has 3 rotation players (10%+ minutes played) with a positive value-score. This was the fewest above-bubble players on any KU team since 1993 (2017 had 4). On average, KU has 6.1 rotation players per season achieve a positive, or above-bubble, value.
The above waterfall chart does a great job showing where KU was getting its value from and where it was losing its value. This chart makes those who blame K.J. Adams or Hunter Dickinson look silly. The team’s struggles stemmed from Elmarko Jackson, Nick Timberlake, Parker Braun, and Jamari McDowell. Harris and Furphy, slightly sub-bubble, were overused due to the team’s lack of depth but still basically KU-level rotation guys.
To Harris’s credit, he did play better in higher-leverage game (positive 0.53 POCWAB).
The following players accounted for team-MVP games: K.J. Adams (11), Hunter Dickinson (9), Kevin McCullar (7), Dajuan Harris (3), Johnny Furphy (2), and Nicolas Timberlake (2).
KU’s average game-score at home (+8.34) was far superior to its average game-score in true road games (-0.59).
The injury to Kevin McCullar hurt the Jayhawks. Kansas was a +5.51 team in games where Kevin McCullar played, and -2.39 team in games where he did not (8 total games missed).
In a similar vein, KU was a +5.35 team through the Iowa State game. Kevin would miss the next game due to injury, while playing off-and-on and through pain some nights the rest of the season. In these final fourteen games, KU was a +1.23 team.
Dejuan Harris had his 5th team-MVP game of the season as the #1 seed Kansas Jayhawks defeated the #8 seed West Virginia Mountaineers in the Big 12 Tournament. Of the 8 Jayhawks who played, all were positive-value except Bobby Pettiford. Kansas advances to play Iowa State in the Big 12 Semifinals.
Dejuan Harris had his best career game and his 3rd team-MVP of the season. He was also KU’s best offensive and defensive player Saturday, something which has occurred in only 7 of the team’s 29 games this season. Over his last 6 games, Dejuan has averaged a game score of +6.07, the best on the team in that span.
Kevin McCullar, Gradey Dick, and Jalen Wilson each had slightly positive games. McCullar made numerous impressive defensive plays in the second half, but also gave up a few baskets. He hit some nice shots to finish with a positive offensive outing. Dick would have had a better game, but he gave points away in the final few minutes. Jalen Wilson had a quiet game but still managed to do enough to generate positive value.
K.J. Adams was the only starter to record a negative-value game. The bench had its worst game in weeks. Hopefully this is just a blip that will be corrected in upcoming games.
The TEAM score of +1.79 was the team’s lowest since the road Iowa State loss, but it was still good enough to earn the team the win. Let’s hope the gray/white jerseys are done with. Traditional color schemes need to be preserved.
Earlier in the season, WAR (Wins Above Replacement) was introduced. I wanted to catch up with the 2023 team to see where each member of the roster is, in terms of Career WAR.
Currently, the rest of the team apart from Jalen Wilson has 6.74 Career WAR, with most of this coming from the play this season. This means that Jalen Wilson, with 11.29 Career WAR, is 62.6% of the current roster’s entire Career WAR at Kansas. His combination of experience and skill mean that this really is Jalen’s team. How far this team goes in March will depend on him.
Speaking of Jalen Wilson, it is all but assured that this season will be his final as a Jayhawk. He almost left after last season, but he returned understanding that a solid junior season could help his pro-prospects. He’s achieved all he wanted to do, and more. With a national championship under his belt, there’s little left for him to do in college regardless of the rest of the season. Jayhawk fans should be grateful for all that he’s provided for the program.
Jalen has really done all of this in 3 seasons, even if it says he’s played 4 in the chart above. This is only technically true. Technically he did appear in 2 games (for 2 total minutes) in his true freshman season before being injured. And technically, he does have 2 more seasons of college eligibility following this one since he took a medical redshirt and also got the “free” Covid year (in 2021). But as was stated earlier, this will certainly be his final season at KU.
But he still has some season left. 4 games in the regular season, with a potential of 9 more in the Big 12/NCAA Tournaments. Let’s compare his Career WAR to other Jayhawk greats to see how he stacks up. Since 1994, WAR estimates have been provided by season. This encompasses 30 seasons (including the current one) and 172 Jayhawks who have played at least one second of a regular season KU game. To clarify things, this range of years (1994 – 2023) means that certain players’ careers are interrupted. In other words, we have stats for Greg Ostertag (7.09 WAR) from his junior and senior seasons, but not his freshman or sophomore years. And Steve Woodberry had an excellent senior year (4.83 WAR) in 1994, but his first three seasons aren’t included on this list. It’s doubtful that either of these guys are at Jalen’s career level at this point, but it was still something that needed to be said.
So, at 11.29, how does Wilson’s Career WAR stack up? At this point, he is at #17 (out of a total 172), having just passed Jacque Vaughn. Next on the Career WAR list is Devon Dotson, a name which might be surprising to some people. Dotson was extremely good during his 2 years in Lawrence. If we estimate that Wilson will play ~ 9 more games (a conservative but not overly cautious guess), Wilson will have a excellent chance to pass not only Dotson but also Kirk Hinrich (#15), Drew Gooden (#14), and maybe even Cole Aldrich (#13).
Here’s the list of all players with a Career WAR over +10 from the years (1994 – 2023):
WAR is calculated by using a multiple to convert value points (points above replacement) into an estimated amount of “wins.” What this multiple is depends upon a separate conversion, and so changes as more data comes in. In short, the exact WAR number is in flux as more games are played, even for players that are non-current. This doesn’t change the order of the players, but it does change the WAR estimate. So don’t be surprised if these numbers don’t match a separate, more current list of WAR. I plan on pinning a link to Career WAR at the end of the season.
Either way, we see in green the players who’ve had their jerseys retired, and in blue the current players (Jalen Wilson). Jalen is in the company of some great names, and will end his career in the area which normally earns one a jersey ceremony. Given that he has a strong candidacy for 1st-team All-American this season, that he will get that jersey retirement in the future looks almost certain.
As he has effectively played only 3 seasons, it’s fun to compare him to other 3-year players. If he can pass Gooden and Aldrich (which he has a shot to do), then the only names that will outdo him for their KU careers in a 3-year career over the past 30 seasons are Mario Chalmers, Paul Pierce, and Marcus Morris. He’s had an amazing career.
Next on the list we’ll look at Gradey Dick, and compare him to other 1-and-done freshmen.
Of course, Dick has not officially become a 1-and-done player yet. But given his skillset and draft potential, this is the most likely thing. KU has had 10 1-and-done players under the criteria that a player leaves college after 1 season to go pro (KU has had other 1-year transfer players such as Remy Martin or Bryce Thompson…these are left off). The majority of these guys were “wing” type players, with a few post men as well as SG/CG Josh Selby. Of these wings, Dick keeps good company. Again, it depends on the number of games he has left. But extrapolating his current play to an additional 9 games, and he will be above Oubre and just below Embiid/Henry/Jackson. With a stretch of solid play and a deep run in the NCAA Tournament, Dick could leap into 3rd on this list. Gradey’s been as good as advertised.
Last, let’s try and forecast Dejuan Harris’ career using WAR. Harris began his career with a negative-WAR season in 2021. He was someone who hardly scored the ball, and while his defense had potential he would still be bullied by stronger players quite often. Harris has improved on both of these areas, and is now generating positive impact for Kansas. With 2 more seasons of eligibility remaining and little chance of him leaving the program early, let’s look at how his season-by-season play has been.
From this table, we can see each of Harris’ seasons from most recent to oldest. We see that he has increased his playing time (he is on the floor in 83.1% of available minutes), his scoring, and in turn his WAR. Assuming that his final two seasons will be at least as good as this one (with likely value growth, albeit slower growth), we might estimate it as follows:
2025: 3.50
2024: 3.25
2023: 3.00
2022: 0.63
2021: -0.56
CAREER PROJECTION: 9.35 WAR
The comparison list here is of multi-year players who were legitimate PG’s or lead ball-handling guards. This will include guys that aren’t necessary thought of as “pure-PG’s” but still handled the ball in that role. These are the types of players that Dejuan Harris would have been competing for regarding playing time had he played in a different era.
From a projected Career WAR, he might end up roughly halfway up the list. Now this still has to happen, and he would benefit from a 5th season that the others didn’t get, but his trajectory places him as a legitimate KU-level player, something that wasn’t apparent during his first season.
Kansas went to 19-5 (7-4) with a huge Big Monday win. Dejuan Harris led the team in value, producing a value-score of +7.29 for his second team-MVP game of the season. He had a positive impact on both ends of the floor to help the Hawks secure the victory. Kevin McCullar was also effective, scoring in double-figures while also adding offensive value through numerous assists. McCullar has had a nice stretch over his past 5 games, averaging +5.44 points of value per game above bubble. K.J. Adams also contributed a positive outing for only the second time in his last 7.
On the negative side of things, Jalen Wilson had his worst game of the season in an uncharacteristic manner. Scoring on 2 points and adding an assist, Wilson was shut down on the offensive end all night. He also gave up more baskets than he’s accustomed to, contributing to his second game of the year where he had a negative effect on both ends of the floor (Indiana was the other). Strange as it may be, Jalen seems to play better when others around him aren’t.
Gradey Dick had as good an offensive outing as anyone Monday night (tied with McCullar, who added his offensive value in a different style). Dick went 2-3 from downtown and finished at the rim effectively to produce nearly 5 points of offensive value. It was his defense which drove him into the red, particularly late in the game. Dick has been a serviceable defender, particularly when you consider his age and role on the team. He has to continue to work on improving on that end and prove his worth, as team’s will game plan around his perceived weaknesses.
Now on to the bench. With five scholarship players out due to injury (Pettiford, Clemence, Ejiofor, Cuffe, Martin), KU went into the game knowing it had to make due with a shortened rotation. And the reserves who were healthy stepped up in a big way. Joe Yesufu had his best offensive game of the season and has now produced three consecutive positive outings for his team. Ernest Udeh finally broke into the plus-side of things. He’s been bringing good energy recently, but his value scores weren’t showing the full effort he brought. M.J. Rice made numerous good hustle plays, finishing with a basket and a couple assists and solid defense in 14.6 minutes of play. The bench has now outperformed the starting 5 for 3 games in a row.
While KU continues to win close games, it is in spite of its bench players. This phenomenon was discussed earlier in the season, and the discrepancy between its starters and bench has remained. Self has continued to play Bobby Pettiford and Joseph Yesufu as reserve guards, with an oft-injured M.J. Rice having not playing in the last three games. Zuby Ejiofor has been KU’s most-frequently-used bench big man in conference play (27 minutes), followed by Zach Clemence (21 minutes) and Cam Martin (6 minutes). Ernest Udeh has played in only 1 second of conference play. Yes, just 1 second. This came at the end of the Oklahoma State game when he was guarding the inbounds pass.
Since the last time we examined their performance, the KU bench has hardly changed in overall value it provides. After 10 games, the bench was positioned to earn about -3.00 WAR over a normalized 36-game schedule. With 17 games in the book, this has hardly budged. The 2023 bench is still the worst bench in the 20-year Self-era, and with no signs of improvement would be only the 6th bench to produce negative-WAR value over that time span.
One thing to consider is that there is a sort of floor to this number. The worse the bench plays, the less Self will go to it. Through 5 conference games, the starters have averaged 32.5 minutes per game each. This is Self maxing out starter-minutes. He cannot play them much more, considering foul trouble will occur at times and fatigue will set in. With limited bench minutes, two things should keep the number somewhat afloat. First, the bench has less collective time on the floor to perform poorly. Second, in limited minutes the bench players should have the energy to play each defensive possession 100%. The bench should be giving maximum effort when they are out there, thus maximizing their potential value on a possession basis.
There are various ways to quantify the dreadfulness of the bench rotation. We have used the WAR value metric to compare the 2023 bench to others in the Self-era. Now we will compare the 2023 starters – Harris, McCullar, Dick, Wilson, and Adams – to the remainder of the team using Adj. Points AB +/-. This metric compares a player’s value, in points relative to a bubble-level opponent (about the 45th best team in D-1). Anything positive is quite good and should earn the player rotation minutes, with anything greater than +2.00 indicating a performance level that would start on almost any KU team.
The following numbers are thus presented per game, collectively divided between starters and bench.
The starting 5 produces an average difference of 13.16 points above a bubble team per game. They have been tremendous. This year’s starters have collectively out-done last season’s starting 5, which were +10.83 points above bubble per game. For the Missouri game, the starters were an absurd +39.84. They have only been below bubble-level as a group twice this season, first against Omaha (which was technically their worst opponent-adjusted performance) and second against Tennessee. Even then, these games were barely below the 0 threshold.
In contrast, the bench has played to a bubble-standard in only four games (23.5% of games). Ironically, its best game was against Omaha with a +5.02 performance, which is also the only time it has outperformed the starting 5. Its worst outing was against Southern Utah, in a game that was only close because of the reserves. Worse, the bench is trending downward. It hasn’t produced a positive outing since the Indiana game. Last season, on a team that featured seniors like Mitch Lightfoot, Jalen Coleman-Lands, and of course Remy Martin off the bench; it was collectively -0.52 and produced 17 games above bubble-standard (42.5%). This number was much higher at the end of the season when it counted, as the bench collectively produced an average game of +5.53 in the 9 games that made up the 2 tournaments. This was due to the great play of Remy, as well as a shortened rotation that played the senior reserves far more than the underclass backups. Suffice to say, the 2023 team doesn’t currently have that kind of fire-power waiting in the wings. It has underclassmen and transfers, none of whom have proven any capacity to be consistently great at the upper echelons of the D1 level.
Having a poor bench is no reason to despair. History has shown that teams with great starters can win in the Tournament despite having little help from its reserves. The 2012 runners-up had a very similar divide between a strong starting 5 and weak bench. However, even the 2012 bench had experience; Kevin Young was a redshirt junior and Conner Teahan a fifth-year senior. The 2016 team is another good comparison. It earned the number-one overall seed and made an Elite 8 on the backs of its experienced starters, getting little from its bench.
There are a few potential bright spots to consider when pondering the bench situation. First, is that KU has talented young players on its roster. It really only takes the development of one or two of the following by March for this situation to drastically improve: Pettiford, Yesufu, Rice, Ejiofor, Udeh, Clemence. If KU can comfortably play any of these guys 10 minutes or so and expect a consistent performance, it can better maintain leads that its starting 5 works to build. The second consideration doesn’t have to do with the bench, but with the makeup of the starting 5. The starters are all capable of playing a heavy-load, thus reducing the negative-impact the bench has collectively brought. K.J. Adams is far more like a wing than a post in terms of fitness and durability, meaning that even the 5-spot needs fewer bench minutes this season than it historically does.
Lastly, where should the team go from here? In comparing Per 100 points above bubble, there is good reason to like the potential development of Udeh and Ejiofor. These two have clearly been superior to other bench-players, particularly the other 5 men. While Ejiofor has gotten in games consistently, Udeh has been relegated to DNPs of late. Perhaps this should be reexamined, particularly if Clemence continues to defend at a poor level.
There hasn’t been much value from the reserve guards/wings. Injuries have plagued all four (with Cuffe still out), and even when healthy none have provided consistent value. The team loses scoring ability, size, and defensive skill when it goes to the bench and gains little. Shifting K.J. down to the 4 when Jalen is out is honestly a worthy consideration.
Charting the Hawks 