A Look Through the Bracket in the 64-Team Era

Through the 2025 NCAA Tournament, this post examines all 40 seasons of the 64-team bracket (which began in 1985)1, specifically focusing on how seed-lines have performed in comparison to each other. Yes, the bracket has technically expanded to 68 teams, but effectively it is still a 64-team format. It’s just that there are four extra, play-in games (two between the four worst automatics, two between the four worst at-large teams) to determine the final 64 teams.

Round of 64 Results

40 tournaments, with 4 regionals in each tournament, mean there are 160 total seeds in this time. 160 1-seeds (Kansas has 16 of these2), 160 2-seeds, etc. It also means that there have been 160 First Round games featuring seeds which add up to 17 (1 v. 16, 2 v. 15, etc.). Here’s how these match-ups have turned out over the past 40 tournaments.

The 1-seeds average 84.23 points and allow 59.70, for an average difference of 24.53 points. They have gone 158-2 overall, winning 99% of games against the 16-seeds. From here, we see a drop-off for the favorite as the seeds converge until we get to the 8/9 match-up which is virtually even.

There appears to be a steady drop-off in success by favored seed until you get to the 5-seed, which doesn’t even win 2/3 of its games against the 12. The next chart compares each Round of 64 favored seed to the next seed down and produces a multiple. For instance, how much more likely is it that a 1-seed wins than a 2-seed? Or rather, how much more likely is it that a 2-seed gets upset than a 1-seed?

This shows that the biggest drop-off in terms of avoiding a First Round upset is from the 1-line to the 2-line. 1-seeds are 5.83x more likely to make it to the Second Round than 2-seeds. After that, there are smaller differences when you step down a seed-line. Because these are multiples, one can multiply down the line to compare seeds that aren’t next to each other. For instance, in order to find out how much more likely a 12/5 upset is than a 15/2, simply times 2.27 by 1.55 by 2.19. This gets 7.70. In other words, a 2-seed is over 7 times more successful at winning in the Round of 64 than a 5-seed is.

KU Focus R64

KU has earned 16 1-seeds, 7 2-seeds, 5 3-seeds, 6 4-seeds, 1 5-seed, 2 6-seeds, 1 7-seed, and 1 8-seed in the modern tournament era. This accounts for 39 out of 40 years, as the Jayhawks didn’t make the 1989 NCAA Tournament. In that time, KU has won 36 games (36-3). It’s projected record, given its seeds, is actually 34.3-4.7. So, KU has overachieved in this round. People may remember Bucknell and Bradley, but in terms of big upsets, that’s all there’s been. Don’t take for granted how good KU has been in avoiding opening round disappointments.

Round of 32 Results

The Second Round features games that can only be between these pods of seed-lines:

  • 1/16 v. 8/9
  • 4/13 v. 5/12
  • 3/14 v. 6/11
  • 2/15 v. 7/10

Of these possible matchups, only the 16 v. 8 game has never occurred. In the only two times the 16-seed defeated the 1, the 9-seed won its matchup against the 8. The winning percentage by seed-line in this round is as follows:

  • 1-seed: 86%
  • 2-seed: 68%
  • 3-seed: 61%
  • 4-seed: 61%
  • 5-seed: 54%
  • 6-seed: 48%
  • 7-seed: 30%
  • 8-seed: 21%
  • 9-seed: 10%
  • 10-seed: 40%
  • 11-seed: 43%
  • 12-seed: 38%
  • 13-seed: 18%
  • 14-seed: 9%
  • 15-seed: 36%
  • 16-seed: 0%

This trend begins reasonably enough, with the 1-seed being more successful than the 2-seed and so on. But once we get to the 10-seed, the winning percentage spikes back up. Even the 15-seed has won 36% of its Round of 32 games. Sure, it doesn’t get there that often, but it is 4-7 in this round (while the 9-seed is 8-75).

This is where the structure of the bracket has an effect on how seeds perform. 8’s and 9’s are generally better teams than the double-digit seeds below them, but have a tougher opponent as they face the 1-seed 99% of the time in this round. This causes the 8/9 winner to lose its Second Round game at such a high rate.

One way to look at the Round of 32 is to see which teams get through this round by grouping. We will look at each pod of teams and hope to gain some clarity.

1/16/8/9

  • 1-seed: 136 (85%)
  • 16-seed: 0 (0%)
  • 8-seed: 16 (10%)
  • 9-seed: 8 (5%)

4/13/5/12

  • 4-seed: 77 (48%)
  • 13-seed: 6 (4%)
  • 5-seed: 55 (34%)
  • 12-seed: 22 (14%)

3/14/6/11

  • 3-seed: 84 (53%)
  • 14-seed: 2 (1%)
  • 6-seed: 47 (29%)
  • 11-seed: 27 (17%)

2/15/7/10

  • 2-seed: 102 (64%)
  • 15-seed: 4 (3%)
  • 7-seed: 29 (18%)
  • 10-seed: 25 (16%)

Looking at all these pie-charts next to each other, we can see how much more likely it is for the 1-seed to win than for any other of the better seeds in these First Weekend pods. In terms of getting to the Second Weekend, it better for a team to be a 10 or 11-seed rather than an 8 or 9-seed.

KU Focus R32

This round has infamously been a difficult round for Kansas. In the Self-era, KU is 11-7 in the Round of 32 and 1-4 since 2019. Since 1985, KU is 23-13 in this round, and has failed to make this round 3 other times (2 R64 losses, 1 NCAAT miss). Given KU’s seeds, we’d expect KU to have been to 24.8 Sweet 16’s, indicating that KU is underperforming its seed-line through the First Weekend. Since we know that KU outperformed its First Round record by 1.7 games, we come to the calculation that KU has underperformed in the Round of 32 by 3.5 games. In other words, KU’s 23-13 record should be something like 26-10. Specifically, its multiple losses as a 1-seed (’92, ’98, ’10, ’23) and a 2-seed (’90, ’14, ’15) in this round have been major disappointments and contributed to the gross underperformance.

Sweet 16 Results

The Sweet 16 games begin the Second Weekend, with the bracket starting to winnow down as we approach the Final Four. It is when games tend to get tougher for 1-seeds (who will likely face a 4/5), and where a variety of potential match-ups can occur. The 2 vs. 3 matchup is the second-most-common (behind 1 vs. 4), but it has only happened 31.9% of the time in 160 regionals since 19853.

In order to best understand this round, we’ll consider which seeds make the Elite 8 what percent of time.

  • 1-seed: 67%
  • 2-seed: 45%
  • 3-seed: 26%
  • 4-seed: 16%
  • 5-seed: 8%
  • 6-seed: 11%
  • 7-seed: 6%
  • 8-seed: 6%
  • 9-seed: 3%
  • 10-seed: 6%
  • 11-seed: 6%
  • 12-seed: 1%
  • 13-seed: 0%
  • 14-seed: 0%
  • 15-seed: 1%
  • 16-seed: 0%

Somewhat illuminating is the fact that only the 1-seed is more likely than not to make it past the Sweet 16. And while the 2-seed is close to a 50% chance, this number drops to 1-in-4 for the 3-seed. Of the 640 seeds between 13-16 since 1985, only 1 has made the Elite 8 (2022 Saint Peter’s).

Let’s look at this Sweet 16 match-up from the perspective of the 1’s and 2-seeds. In other words, if a 1-seed makes this round, which seeds are they likely to face?

  • 4-seed: 46%
  • 5-seed: 37%
  • 12-seed: 15%
  • 13-seed: 3%

A full 82% of the time the 1-seed gets to the Sweet 16 it will face a 4 or 5-seed. For the 2-seed, here are its opponents by likelihood.

  • 3-seed: 50%
  • 6-seed: 31%
  • 11-seed: 19%
  • 14-seed: 0%

Similarly, 81% of the time it makes it through to the Sweet 16, a 2-seed faces off against a 3 or 6-seed. Only rarely will it get a double-digit seed in the Sweet 16.

KU Focus S16

KU is 16-7 in this round, which is better than its record in the Round of 32. For Bill Self at Kansas, his teams have a 9-2 record, further cementing the idea that he excels in the tournament games he has more time to prepare for. KU has won its last four in a row playing in this round. Only 2 of these wins were when KU was a 4-seed or worse (1988, 2004), and only once has KU won in this round as a seed-line underdog (1991). One of KU’s most devastating losses happened in this round as well (1997). Overall since ‘85, KU has outperformed seed-expectation by 1.3 games in Sweet 16 contests.

Elite 8 Results

There have been 160 Elite 8 games since 1985. The Elite 8 is the last round to ensure that no two teams of the same seed-line face each other. 107 of these games include a 1-seed, which is the most-likely seed (by far) to make this round. The 2-seed is also frequently at this game, having been there 72 times since 1985.

However, the 1 v. 2 match-up has only happened 51 times, or 31.9% of the time. There have been years when it didn’t occur at all (such as 2022 and 2023). Other oddities of this round include the fact the only 15-seed to make the Elite 8 faced not a 1, 4, or 5-seed but an 8-seed. Since the 14-seed has never made this round, the 1-seed has never faced it either. Here are a list of seeds that each seed-line hasn’t faced in this round that are possible (italics indicate seed has never made E8):

  • 1-seed (14-seed, 15-seed)
  • 2-seed (13-seed, 16-seed)
  • 3-seed (12-seed, 13-seed, 16-seed)
  • 4-seed (14-seed, 15-seed)
  • 5-seed (7-seed, 11-seed, 14-seed, 15-seed)
  • 6-seed (9-seed, 12-seed, 13-seed, 16-seed)
  • 7-seed (5-seed, 9-seed, 12-seed, 13-seed, 16-seed)
  • 8-seed (10-seed, 11-seed, 14-seed, 15-seed)

The 11-seed, which has made a surprising number of Elite 8’s (10), has faced the 1-seed (8 times) a 4-seed and a 9-seed once, but never the 5. The most likely match-up to occur that hasn’t yet is the 5 v. 7. 7 v. 8 is also somewhat likely to occur for the first time in the Elite 8, although it has occurred in later rounds.

Looking at Elite 8 win results is the same thing as showing Final 4 appearances, so we will include the following table:

We’re again struck by the 1-seeds’ relative dominance. While it is more likely than not the 1-seed gets upset before it makes the Final Four, over 2 in 5 1-seeds have made the National Semifinals. More 1-seeds have made the Final Four as have seeds 3 or worse.

KU Focus E8

This is another stressful round for KU fans due to recent history. Since 1985, KU is 10-6 in the Elite 8, having won its most recent two games. Self is 4-5 overall in this round, with Brown and Williams going a combined 6-1 before Self took over. Given KU’s seed-lines, KU has out-performed the Elite 8 round by 1.2 games. Even with Self’s struggles, KU has been a solid Elite 8 team overall in the modern NCAA Tourney era.

Final 4 Results

The Final Four is the first round in which seed-lines can face off against each other, something that happens with some frequency with 1-seeds and almost never with other seeds. Let’s look at who the 1-seeds face when they make the National Semis:

  • 1-seed vs. 1-seed (15 times, or 30 total 1-seeds)
  • 1-seed vs. 2-seed (12 times)
  • 1-seed vs. 3-seed (7 times)
  • 1-seed vs. 4-seed (7 times)
  • 1-seed vs. 5-seed (2 times)
  • 1-seed vs. 7-seed (3 times)
  • 1-seed vs. 8-seed (1 time)
  • 1-seed vs. 9-seed (1 time)
  • 1-seed vs. 10-seed (1 time)
  • 1-seed vs. 11-seed (2 times)

Counting each contest, being sure to count the 1-seed vs. 1-seed games twice, this reconciles us with the 66 total 1-seeds to make the Final Four. 1-seeds have obviously gone 15-15 against each other in these matchups. In the other 36 matchups, where a 1-seed faced a worse seed, the top seeds went 26-10 (72.2%). The last time a non-1-seed defeated a 1-seed in the Final Four (National Semifinal round) was in 2014 (Connecticut over Florida). Since that time there have been 10 straight wins in this round by the top seed when facing a worse seed.

In addition to 1-seeds playing each other 15 times; 2-seeds have faced each other 3 times, 4-seeds once, and 5-seeds once. 3-seeds have never faced each other in the National Semis.

In terms of winning percentage during the Final Four, the seeds with the best success are the 6-seeds (2-1, 67%) and the 8-seeds (4-2, 67%). The 1-seeds win 62.1% of their National Semifinal contests, in large part due to the fact they often play each other (as we showed above, 1-seeds are 72.2% winners against non-1-seeds) whereas 6 and 8-seeds don’t.

A different way to look at the Final Four round is to look at how many of each seed makes the Championship Game. Of the 78 teams to have won in the Final Four (and thus made it to Monday night), 50% of them have been 1-seeds. Here is the rest of the break-down by seed-line:

  • 1-seeds: 41 (51%)
  • 2-seeds: 13 (16%)
  • 3-seeds: 11 (14%)
  • 4-seeds: 4 (5%)
  • 5-seeds: 4 (5%)
  • 6-seeds: 2 (3%)
  • 7-seeds: 1 (1%)
  • 8-seeds: 4 (5%)

After the top 3 seeds, there isn’t much difference between the remaining seeds. The 8-seeds appear to be overrepresented, especially when you consider that no 9-seeds have made the Title Game.

An all 1-seed Final Four has occurred twice (2008, 2025), while a no-1-seed Final Four has occurred three times since 1985.

KU Focus F4

KU has made 10 Final Fours in the modern tournament era. This puts it third, behind Duke (14) and North Carolina (12). KU has gone 6-4 in this span, and it has won 4 of its last 5 National Semifinal contests. Interestingly, KU has faced only 6 different teams in this round since 1985. It has played North Carolina three times, Duke twice, Villanova twice, and Maryland, Ohio State, and Marquette once. And this is just in relation to the Final Four round. The Championship Game has seen KU face off against Duke and North Carolina as well during this time period. Given its seeds over the years, KU’s 6-4 record has put it 0.0 games against normal in this round.

National Championship Results

The National Championship game is distinct from the Final Four or National Semifinal round despite being played at the same place. Many get this confused for some reason, or ignore the magnitude of winning a Final Four game just to get to the National Championship game. There have been 40 National Championship games in the modern tournament era. Here are the teams who have won (total titles in parentheses):

  • Connecticut (6)
  • Duke (5)
  • North Carolina (4)
  • Kansas (3)
  • Kentucky (3)
  • Villanova (3)
  • Florida (3)
  • Louisville (2)
  • UCLA (1)
  • Indiana (1)
  • Syracuse (1)
  • Michigan State (1)
  • Michigan (1)
  • Arkansas (1)
  • Arizona (1)
  • Virginia (1)
  • Maryland (1)
  • Baylor (1)
  • UNLV (1)

What we should first note is that the 1-seeds have dominated National Championships. 1-seeds have collectively won 65% of the Titles, or 26 of 40. The other 14 titles were won by 2-seeds (13%, 5 titles), 3-seeds (10%, 4 titles), 4-seeds (5%, 2 titles), 6-seeds (3%, 1 title), 7-seeds (3%, 1 title), and 8-seeds (3%, 1 title). The 5-seed has never won.

1-seeds have faced off against each other 10 times, obviously going 10-10 in these contests. In the other contests, those of a 1-seed against a non-1-seed, the 1-seed’s record has been 16-5 (76.2%). This dominance is quite significant and helps to explain why 1-seeds appear to be overachieving their National Title numbers. However, this holds if we look at Title Games without 1-seeds.

In the 29 National Championship games which saw two different seeds face off against each other, the better seed’s record is 22-7 (75.9%). This seems to be remarkable. In the first four rounds of the entire tournament since 1985, seed-favorites have only won 71.5% of their games. In other words, seed-upsets are more common the first two weekends than in the final weekend, even though there are multiple seed-lopsided games in the earlier rounds of the tournament (1 v. 16, 2 v. 15, etc.). One would expect more 2-seeds and 3-seeds to defeat 1-seeds, or more 3-seeds and 4-seeds to defeat 2-seeds in the National Title game. But it happens relatively rarely. It was mentioned that 1-seeds have faced each other 10 times in the National Championship game since 1985, but we should add that once have 3-seeds faced each other for the Title (Michigan/Seton Hall in 1989). In 40 64-team Tournaments, never have two 2-seeds faced each other in the National Championship game. This seems almost impossible.4

The average game margin has been 8.7 points. The closest games were 1-point differences (1987, 1989), and the 2008 game was an overtime game decided by 7 points after 45 minutes. The biggest blow out was 30 points (1990). Of all rounds, the National Championship round has seen the closest end-of-game margins, so there’s an argument to be made that the best games have been in this round.

KU Focus NC

KU has played in 6 National Championship games since 1985. These games, in order, are as follows:

  • 1988. (6) Kansas 83, (1) Oklahoma 79
  • 1991. (3) Kansas 65, (2) Duke 72
  • 2003. (2) Kansas 78, (3) Syracuse 81
  • 2008. (1) Kansas 75, (1) Memphis 68
  • 2012. (2) Kansas 59, (1) Kentucky 67
  • 2022. (1) Kansas 72, (8) North Carolina 69

KU has gone 3-3 in the National Championship game in the 64-team era. All 6 of its games have been decided by single-digits. These games have been exciting.

If we consider KU’s seeds over the years, we’d expect them to have won 3.0 National Championship games in this span, which is right where they are. In spite of disappointing losses, “coulda, woulda, shoulda” games, and upset defeats; KU’s 3 national championships are no underachievement. In total, KU overachieves in getting past each round except the Round of 32 and Elite 8. Combined with the fact KU already gets great seeds to begin with, KU’s achievements in March Madness since 1985 have been elite.

3 NCAA Tourney MOP’s in the 64-team era.

  1. Seeding began in 1979 for a 48-team tournament, so there is more data that could be used. However, we will stick with 1985 as the beginning of our exercise for a few reasons. One, the bye-game that the top 4-seed received into the Round of 32 did affect the bracket. If seeds 1-4 had to play First Round games in these seasons, there would have been upsets that would have reverberated throughout the tournament. Two, 1985 is a great starting point because it closely aligns with two other modern innovations. The shot-clock was first used for the 1986 Tournament, and the 3-point line was first introduced for the 1987 Tournament. Therefore, the past 39 years mostly have what we would consider the modern game. A shot-clock, 3-point line, and 64-team bracket. ↩︎
  2. The 2018 season, in which KU officially vacated both their 1-seed and Final Four appearance, is included throughout the numbers in this post. While we don’t include these achievements when comparing KU’s status to other college basketball programs, we are keeping the 2018 results in this exercise for a few reasons. One, KU competed that season with the belief that their results were legitimate. Two, it makes things easier for our dataset. Three, the violation (money from Adidas rep to Silvio De Sousa’s guardian) is hardly a huge violation. Four, there’s a chance these vacated games get revalidated given the NCAA’s recent troubles in the court system. ↩︎
  3. The 1 vs. 4 Sweet 16 matchup happens 37.8% of the time. ↩︎
  4. If we accept that 2-seeds independently have a 16% chance of making the National Championship game, which is their actual total, then we’d expect 2-seeds to face off 3% of the time. In 40 seasons, we’d expect this to occur with a 65.7% chance. So, apparently it isn’t impossible for this not to occur yet. Still, we might expect 2-seeds to make the Title game more frequently than 16%, which if they did would improve their odds of having two 2-seeds face off in the NC game. Bump the 2-seed odds to 25% for a NC appearance, and there’s a 93.4% chance two 2-seeds would face each other in 40 National Title games. ↩︎

Guards and March

Note: This post is one in a series in which we examine the NCAA Tournament in some specific detail. Terms such as “the NCAA’s,” “Tournament,” “Tourney,” “March Madness,” or “March” refer primarily to the NCAA Tournament. Today’s installment looks at the relative importance of guards in the success of NCAA Tournament teams. Initial date of publication: 2/23/2024.

The purpose of this post is to examine if guards really do win in March. There are many claims college basketball fans make that are to the effect that good guards are primarily what matters in the Tournament. Some say that Cinderella runs are fueled mostly by great guard-play, others will extend this to better-seeded teams and say that Final 4 or National Championship teams tend to have elite guards. Others will take this idea even further and claim that interior-based teams which rely on post-play are destined for early exits due to their playing style, regardless of how good they were in the regular season.

Logically this doesn’t really make sense. If a team wins during the season with elite big-men who dominate in the post, why can’t it do so in the NCAA Tournament? After all, it’s the same 40-minute game in the Tournament as it was all year. Sure, maybe there are factors which make March basketball distinct (perhaps the games are officiated slightly differently, etc.), but for the most part the game is mostly the same game it was all season. We should see all types of playing styles work in March.

At the same time, the idea that guard-play is of heightened importance in March does seem to have a hint of truth to it. Looking back to last season’s Tourney (2023 NCAA’s), the Purdue Boilermakers Zach Edeys were a dominant regular season team which earned a 1-seed only to fall in the First Round to 16-seed Fairleigh Dickinson as 23-point favorites. FDU was a guard-oriented team1 that attacked Purdue from the perimeter. Although less-remembered, the 2023 Arizona Wildcats earned a 2-seed on the backs of a strong front-line (with weaker guards) and got bounced by a veteran Princeton team. Other forward-dominant teams also underachieved, whereas strong guard-play propelled Miami and Florida Atlantic to Final 4 appearances. 5’8 point guard Markquis Nowell single-handedly lifted K-State to an Elite 8, averaging 23.5 PPG and 13.5 APG on efficient shooting during his four-game run.

These anecdotes aside, it would be better if we could test to see if a guard-based style is better than a forward or interior-based style in March. But how could we do this? Let’s first by defining the problem and then introduce some terms that will help.

Guards to Posts – A Continuum

We will conceive of how teams play as a playing Style. Teams which feature guards for higher-than-normal minutes or rely on guards for higher-than-normal production will be classified as having a more guards-based style. Teams that rely on interior players to eat minutes or produce value will have a more interior-based style. This metric will be on a continuum. Certain teams will be very guard-heavy; others will be very interior-heavy. And in the middle there will be a bunch of teams with a more-balanced attack.

Terms

In discussing Style, we are attempting to understand where a particular team falls on this guard to post continuum. Style can be used to describe teams in other ways; such as fast vs. slow tempo, man-defense vs. defense with zone-concepts, and so on, but for our purposes in this post when style is used it is referring to how guard-dominant or forward-dominant a team is.

Relatedly, the two poles of this spectrum are guard-oriented and post-oriented. We will use other terms to describe these extremes, such as guard-based or guard-led or guard-dominant. The same terms will be used for the other pole, just with post or interior or forward used instead of guard.

Other terms will be defined when we get to them, but for the rest of the blog-post, keep the above continuum in mind when considering a team’s playing style.

Problem

Teams clearly play different styles, but how do we quantify these differences? What makes a team guard-based or forward-led? In order to classify teams into playing styles, we will need to get each team’s roster of players and classify each player into a certain position. From here, we will need to find a way to appropriately weight each player’s contribution to the team’s style. For instance, a team which has a slew of walk-ons that are all guards but relies on and plays a forward-heavy rotation is better defined as forward-dominant.

Data

We used Bart Torvik to collect the data, including player positional data. Torvik has already classified each player into a position based on his own algorithmic criteria. We will use his data and trust his insight on a basis from which to build our own analysis. Getting to player position, Torvik has classified players into 8 different positions. Using the 1-5, PG-C basketball-position concept, we will assign each position into a numeric role so that a quantifiable analysis can be achieved. These roles, and corresponding numbers are below.

  • Pure PG (1.0)
  • Scoring PG (1.0)
  • Combo G (1.6)
  • Wing G (2.0)
  • Wing F (3.0)
  • Stretch 4 (3.7)
  • PF/C (4.3)
  • C (5.0)

Some of these positions are hybrid-roles, so their numeric value is in between two positions. Torvik doesn’t list anyone as a pure PF (4), but many of these types are filled in the PF/C role with some getting a Stretch 4 role. Stretch 4’s aren’t traditional 4-men, but instead a hybrid between a 4 (bigger, good defensive rebounder) and Wing F (can hit outside shots).

We limited data to include only the 68 NCAA Tournament teams. We then gathered the following information from Torvik for each player that earned 10% of minutes for his team.

  • Player Name
  • Team
  • Role (position)
  • Min%
  • Box Plus-Minus (BPM)

Analysis

There are two different ways that team style can be calculated. One is what we call Style-Value. Style-Value (S-V) is when a team’s style is determined by how much value its guards bring in relative to how much value its interior players bring in. Value itself is calculated through using BPM and converting it to Wins Above Replacement (WAR)2.

The other way to determine team style is by Style-Minutes. Style-Minutes (S-M) calculates style by seeing how many minutes each position plays. Guard-heavy teams will often have multiple point-guards or play 4-guard lineups. Forward-heavy teams will be more traditional in terms of minutes allotment, often having two PF/C types on the floor and/or multiple Wing F’s at times.

These two styles have some correlation to each other, but it isn’t super-strong. We will consider both S-V and S-M in our analysis.

After normalizing style, we see that these teams were the most guard-like in terms of S-V among 2023 NCAA Tournament teams:

  • Penn State (-2.22 z-score, 10-seed, R32)
  • Baylor (-1.92 z-score, 3-seed R32)
  • Kansas State (-1.83 z-score, 3-seed, E8)
  • UCLA (-1.58 z-score, 2-seed, S16)
  • Miami FL (-1.28 z-score, 5-seed, F4)

Compare this list to the most guard-like teams in terms of S-M:

  • Nevada (-2.38 z-score, 10-seed, R64)
  • Fairleigh Dickinson (-2.20 z-score, 16-seed, R32)
  • Vermont (-1.70 z-score, 15-seed, R64)
  • Missouri (-1.69 z-score, 7-seed, R32)
  • Colgate (-1.53 z-score, 15-seed, R64)

The top list shows the teams that had elite guard-play, particularly relative to their forwards. The second list shows mid and low-major teams that relied on guard-play, although it wasn’t necessarily that they had elite guards. When we deal with teams in the NCAA Tournament, you have to understand that each team has different goals. For a top seed, making the Final 4 is a reasonable goal. For double-digits seeds, the more likely goal is just an upset win. So we will use both lists, S-V and S-M.

There were different ways to analyze the relative success of guard-oriented teams. We first looked to see how strong the correlation was between style and overall success. We looked for correlation between style and relative success (to seed). There was only a tiny correlation between guard-oriented style and team success, with S-M seeing stronger correlation than S-V.

After viewing correlation, we looked to see if the most guard-oriented teams fared better than the most forward-oriented teams. We filtered out only the styles that were a SD more guard-like than the mean or a SD more forward-like than the mean. Using S-V, we saw that the most guard-like teams won +2.1 games more than expected overall and the most forward-like teams won -3.6 games than expected overall. This was an advantage of 5.7 wins in favor of the guard-heavy teams and worked out to 0.3 wins per team. This isn’t a small difference.

We did the same thing for S-M, and got a difference of +4.4 wins for the heavy-guard teams relative to the forward-heavy teams (which worked out to about 0.2 wins per team). Again these results are in the direction of supporting the conventional wisdom regarding guards and March.

Next we looked at head-to-head results. Previously it was just records overall. But we wanted to see if having a heavier guard-based style was advantageous in head-to-head contests. In the NCAA Tournament there were 67 games played, and the more guard-based S-V team won 36 of these games. For S-M, the more guard-based team won 29/67. These results may seem conflicting, but they actually will lead us to a later insight.

Looking at head-to-head contests but considering Wins Against Expectation (WAE), we see that guard-oriented teams overachieve on the whole. Teams that are more guard-oriented than their opponents won +2.07 more expected games (S-V) or +2.43 more expected games (S-M).

If we look at head-to-head contests from the perspective of the underdog, we see that guard-based underdogs have a +1.80 WAE and forward-based underdogs have a -0.86 WAE in terms of S-V. This comes to a difference of +2.66 in favor of guards-based teams. Looking at the same thing from S-M, this is +1.57 and -1.76 WAE, or a difference of +3.33 in favor of guards-based teams. This doesn’t seem insignificant. Playing a guard-oriented style seemingly helps underdog teams overachieve in March.

We will look at final margin. Using S-V, we see that the more guard-based team is better than its opponent by 0.7 points per game. Using S-M, this is nearly 2.0 points per game better for the guard-based team. It makes sense that if the guard-based team is winning more than expected it is also doing better on expected margin.

So far in head-to-head results, we’ve been considering which team was relatively more guard-oriented to its opponent. But it isn’t like teams can schedule which style on the bracket they get to play against. They can, of course, determine the make-up of their own style. So what happens if we look at the relative success for guard-based teams regardless of opponent?

There were 30 games which faced a guard-oriented team against a forward-oriented team (using S-V). Paradoxically from what we’ve seen from earlier results, the results viewed this way favor forward-based teams. When we look at how guards-based teams fare against forward-based teams, the guards-based teams underachieve, with -2.53 WAE and -1.6 points per game (forwards-based teams are the inverse).

But when we do the same exercise on Style-Minutes, we see that guards-based teams overachieve by +6.05 WAE and are +5.1 points per game better than expected. This shows the importance of defining style. If we say a team is guards-based by looking at the relative value that team’s guards provide, it can give a whole different answer than if we say a team is guards-based by looking at its minutes distribution by position.

Making Some Conclusions

So where does this leave us? Is style important? Do guards win in March? And if so, how can this be used by coaches to gain competitive advantage?

Based on evidence so far, we would conclude not that interior-based styles are doomed to fail, but that guards-based styles are more likely to overachieve in March Madness. While there are weak correlations seen when we regress a team’s style against its success in the 2023 NCAA Tournament, when we filter out the most guard-heavy and forward-heavy teams, there is a clear bias in favor of the guard-heavy teams (relative to pre-Tournament expectation).

Likewise, when we view head-to-head results, the team that is more guard-oriented outperforms the team that is more forward-oriented on the whole. If we look at guard-based teams in head-to-head results (regardless of opponent-style), there is a contradictory answer based on if we base style upon value (Style-Value) or minutes (Style-Minutes). In all assessments, the Style-Minutes view showed stronger benefit for guard-based teams.

Overachievement is the key word. Guards-based styles displayed a better chance of winning when looking at pre-game or pre-Tournament expectation.

However, it isn’t clear how much coaches can use this to their advantage. Particularly because they do so already. Low and mid-major teams looking to pull the upset off are already more likely to be more guard-oriented than their favored opponent. In fact, of all the correlations we ran, the strongest one we found was between a team’s pre-Tournament computer strength and its style as a forward-based team. The best teams heading into the 2023 NCAA Tournament were more likely to be interior-based when compared to the average Tourney team.

But if low to mid-major teams gain a March advantage by playing guard-based styles, can this be neutralized by favorites looking to stave off an upset by playing small themselves? This is tough to say. In one sense, coaches of top teams are best to stick with the style that got them to a good seed in the NCAA’s, as they are still the favorite against the guard-based underdog. A favorite changing its playing style to become more guard-focused might help in some areas but hurt in far more areas (such as dominating the glass and paint). This trade-off might not be worth it.

Additionally, and this hasn’t been analyzed, but favorites might already be changing up their styles during March Madness, and this is partially to blame. Perhaps forward-based teams are going away from what got them to the Big Dance once things get tight in a early-round game, and this is being reflected in the data! We just don’t know.

We’ll close this section with examining the biggest upset in the 2023 Tourney. Purdue’s loss was blamed on its guards, and it strengthened the claim of those who say guards win in March. At the same time, this ignores how well Zach Edey played. Edey had 21 points, 15 rebounds, and 3 blocks. He drew fouls and made FDU work on the defensive end. While it wasn’t enough, had Purdue escaped the upset it would have been due to the team’s interior play. The point is that Purdue wouldn’t have benefited from changing up the style of play that earned it a 1-seed. Rather, it just needed its guards to not choke. The guards/wings went 5-26 from 3. Purdue had 16 turnovers but forced only 9. It lost the game on the perimeter for sure. But if Edey didn’t play, it wouldn’t have had the big advantage inside either, which would have made things worse.

More to Come

With the 2024 tournament coming up, it will be interesting to see if these patterns hold and if this information can be used in filling out a bracket. Picking guard-based top seeds to make deeper runs (using S-V) or double-digit upsets (using S-M) might be a successful strategy. We’ll fill out a few brackets using these principles and see how they do.

Beyond this, we will want to see if this is consistent across tournaments. 2023 had quite a few upsets, so this could have been the reason guards-based teams overachieved. Maybe 2019 (all but one S16 team was a 5-seed or better) or 2008 (all Final 4 teams were 1-seeds) will show the reverse. Maybe upsets or deep-runs are more memorable when a team is led by its guards, and this clouds our view on how style plays into Tournament success.

  1. FDU was certainly guard-oriented from a minutes-played perspective, but in terms of player-value, FDU was not a team which featured even average guard-play during the 2023 season. FDU wasn’t good at all during the 2023 season, and entered the NCAA Tournament somewhere in the mid-200’s in computer rankings. If anything, it could be seen as having better forwards than guards as its interior players were less-bad than its guards. ↩︎
  2. WAR multiplies BPM by Min% by a set # of games by a multiple to estimate a player’s contribution to team wins. ↩︎